

Religion and Democratic Commitment: A Unifying Motivational Framework

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There is no easy answer to the question of whether religiosity promotes or hinders commitment to democracy. Earlier research largely pointed to religiosity as a source of antidemocratic orientations. More recent empirical evidence is less conclusive, however, suggesting that the effect of religiosity on democratic commitment could be positive, negative, or null. We review the existing approaches to the study of religiosity and democratic commitment, focusing on support for the democratic system, political engagement, and political tolerance, by distinguishing accounts that examine a single dimension of religiosity from accounts that adopt a multidimensional approach. We show that multidimensional approaches, while effective in accounting for the effect of religiosity on discrete democratic norms, fall short of accounting for some of the inconsistencies in the literature and in identifying the mechanisms that may be responsible for shaping how religiosity affects endorsement of democratic norms as a whole. To fill this gap, we propose the Religious Motivations and Expressions (REME) model. Applying theories of goal constructs to religion, this model maps associations between three religious expressions (belief, social behavior, and private behavior) and the religious motivations that underly these expressions. We discuss how inconsistent associations between religiosity and elements of democratic commitment can be rendered interpretable once the motivations underlying religious expressions, as well as contextual information, are accounted for. We contend that applying goal constructs to religion is critical for understanding the nature of the religion-democracy nexus.

KEY WORDS: religion, faith, democracy, motivation, support for the democracy, political engagement, tolerance

Despotism may govern without faith, but liberty cannot. Religion... is more needed in democratic republics than in any others.

(Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Chapter XVII, 1835)

Approximately 62% of the world's population regard religion as important in their daily lives (Pew Research Center, 2020). The ubiquity of religion, together with the common concern that it may subvert democratic norms, raises critical questions regarding its precise role in facilitating or

impeding commitment to democratic norms. As early as the 1950s, academic giants like Allport (1954) and Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) dealt with the role of religion in the making or unmaking of democratic attitudes. While the debate over religion's role in the promotion or endangerment of democratic norms later faded due to the influence of secularization theory (Norris & Inglehart, 2004), the global resurgence of religion in the 21st century has proven that religion is a resilient force in social and political affairs (Thomas, 2005; Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011). Consequently, the discussion over the role of religion in democracy has returned to the forefront of the academic debate. This burgeoning literature is divided over whether religiosity threatens or promotes democratic norms (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2020).

This article first presents an overview of the current approaches and challenges in the study of religion and commitment to democratic norms, exposing the complex relationship between the two. It then integrates several bodies of literature to propose a motivational goal-constructs approach, termed *the Religious Motivations and Expressions (REME) model* and applies it to the study of religion and democratic commitment. We propose that focusing on the various motivations underlying different expressions of the religious experience provides a dynamic framework that explains the inconsistent findings in the literature and points to novel avenues for research.

The Religion-Democracy Puzzle

Alexis de Tocqueville famously argued that religious principles from the Judeo-Christian tradition supply the moral foundations necessary for liberty (1835). Indeed, religious groups have been at the forefront of democratization movements and in struggles for freedom, such as women's rights and the abolition of slavery (Nepstad & Williams, 2008; Toft et al. 2011). Other thinkers, such as Rawls and Habermas, disagree that religion serves democratic ends, arguing that religious convictions should be excluded from the political domain (Habermas, 2006; Rawls, 1993). This line of thought stresses the threat posed to democracy by the absolutist nature of religion—its ownership of the truth, its tendency for social hierarchies and dogmatism, and the absolute sovereignty of God over and above state institutions (Adorno et al., 1950; Lipset, 1959)—and sometimes even regards religion as the “enemy of democracy... as long as it has not been defanged and privatized” (Beit-Hallahmi, 2004, p. 33).

Mirroring the conflicting accounts in the theoretical literature, empirical research on the relationship between religion and democratic commitment, defined as support for the democratic regime, its institutions, and its key principles, has yielded inconsistent results. At the individual level, religiosity is sometimes associated with endorsement of democratic norms, but sometimes with their rejection.

As an illustration, we conducted a search of the empirical literature on individual-level religiosity and interest in politics, a prerequisite for democratic engagement, which is a key democratic ideal (Almond & Verba, 1963). We used keyword searches of electronic databases including Google Scholar and JSTOR and reference lists of relevant publications, combining each one of the terms *religiosity*, *religion* or *religious* with *political interest*, *news consumption*, or *discussing politics*. We excluded the studies that did not meet our inclusion criteria¹ from a pool of 27 journal articles and one book. Our inclusion criteria were met by seven publications comprising 18 effects (see Table 1). As can be seen from the table, even when using highly restrictive criteria for inclusion, the reported relationships between religion and interest in politics can be statistically null, negative, or positive.

¹This included works that reported the relationship between religiosity and related concepts, such as voting, participation, and political consumerism, or reported an index of participation that combined political interest with other concepts, such as protest or voting or works that did not include empirical analysis, such as review essays.

Table 1. Relationships Between Individual Religiosity and Interest in Politics

#	Religiosity Measure	Political Interest Measure	Relationship	Source	Sample/Data Source
1	Religious foreclosure ^a	Index of interest in politics and external efficacy	Negative	De Haan and Schulenberg (1997)	Convenience sample (US college students)
2	Religious achievement ^b	Index of interest in politics and external efficacy	Negative	De Haan and Schulenberg (1997)	Convenience sample (US college students)
3	Index of attending religious services and daily prayer	Interest in politics	Negative	Norris and Inglehart (2004)	WVS (1981–2001, pooled)
4	Index of attending religious services and daily prayer	Political discussion	Negative	Norris and Inglehart (2004)	WVS (1981–2001, pooled)
5	Belonging to a religious association	Political discussion	Negative	Norris and Inglehart (2004)	WVS (1981–2001, pooled)
6	Intrinsic religiosity	Index of interest in politics and external efficacy	N.S.	De Haan and Schulenberg (1997)	Convenience sample (US college students)
7	Christian orthodoxy	Index of interest in politics and external efficacy	N.S.	De Haan and Schulenberg (1997)	Convenience sample (US college students)
8	Church/temple importance	Index of interest in politics and external efficacy	N.S.	De Haan and Schulenberg (1997)	Convenience sample (US college students)
9	Index of importance of religion and daily prayer	Index of interest in politics, following political affairs, political discussion, importance of politics	N.S.	Read (2007)	MAPS survey of Muslim Americans (2001, 2004)
10	Index of importance of religion and spiritual fulfilment and belief in God	Index of political discussion	N.S.	Shah et al. (2007)	Chicago Life Style Study (2002, 2004, 2005)
11	Participation in church discussion networks	National news consumption	Positive	Scheufele, Nisbet, and Brossard (2003)	American National Election Studies (2000)
12	Participation in church discussion networks	Political knowledge	Positive	Scheufele et al. (2003)	American National Election Studies (2000)
13	Belonging to a religious association	Interest in politics	Positive	Norris and Inglehart (2004)	WVS (1981–2001, pooled)
14	Religious devoutness (vs being secular)	Interest in politics	Positive	Patterson (2004)	Latinobarometer (2000)
15	Religious devoutness (vs being secular)	Following politics	Positive	Patterson (2004)	Latinobarometer (2000)
16	Index of organisational religiosity	Index of interest in politics, following political affairs, political discussion, importance of politics	Positive	Read (2007)	MAPS survey of Muslim Americans (2001, 2004)
17	Index of political religiosity	Index of interest in politics, following political affairs, political discussion, importance of politics	Positive	Read (2007)	MAPS survey of Muslim Americans (2001, 2004)
18	Active religious membership	Index of interest in politics and political discussion	Positive	Manglos and Weinreb (2013)	Afrobarometer (2008)

Note. Table entries are (from left to right) row numbers, measures of religiosity and political interest, the reported relationships between the two measures (with N.S. indicating nonsignificant statistical findings), the source, as well as data source/sample information from existing studies. All measures reported in the table indicate higher levels of the religiosity and political interest.

^aCommitting to religious identity without examining deeply.

^bReaching a well-defined commitment after a period of active exploration.




Figure 1. Correlation coefficients between religiosity and political interest among Catholics in Catholic-majority countries. Entries are correlation coefficients between religiosity and interest in politics for Catholic respondents in countries where Catholicism is majority religion. Data comes from World Values Surveys (WVS). The per country results in the left-hand side are from data collected between 2010 and 2014 (Wave 6), and the results in right-hand side are results from pooled analysis of Waves 4, 5, and 6. Religiosity is an additive measure combining (1) whether the respondent is religious, (2) the importance of god in respondent's life, (3) frequency of attendance to places of worship, and (4) whether the respondent is a member of a religious organization (all items carry equal weight). Political interest is a 4-point Likert item asking respondents their level of interest in politics. A darker tone indicates $p < .05$. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

What accounts for such discrepant findings? One possible explanation is differences in conceptualizations and measures used as indicators of political interest in different studies. Political interest is operationalized as self-reported level of interest (rows 3, 13, 14) or following politics (row 15), frequency of political discussion (rows 4, 5), national news consumption (row 11), political knowledge (row 12), or some combination of these variables (rows 1–2, 6–10, 16–18). A second possible explanation could be that the relationship between religiosity and support for democratic norms may depend on differences between religious traditions or the country-level religious context. However, rarely does using consistent measures or accounting for variation in religious tradition fully clarify the picture. To demonstrate this, we calculated the correlation coefficients for religiosity and political interest among Catholic respondents in the most recent Wave 6 of the World Values Survey (WVS, 2010–14) in countries where Catholicism is the majority religion.² We used the same measures for religiosity and political interest across countries: a 4-point Likert item for political interest and a scale of four items for religiosity. Furthermore, the focus on a single tradition minimizes the potential for variation in religious beliefs and values, especially in a hierarchical religion such as Catholicism.

The results, depicted in the left-hand side of Figure 1, show that even when we minimize the differences across religious traditions and use the same measure of interest, the relationship between religiosity and political interest varies vastly. The right-hand side of Figure 1 presents the pooled correlation coefficients for this group of respondents in World Values Surveys from the last two decades. The coefficients are negative and statistically significant for the 2005–2009 and 2010–14 waves

²Countries where Catholics constitute the largest group among religious adherents (Source: The Association of Religion Data Archives, <http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/>).

(Waves 5 and 6) but positive and statistically different from zero for the 1999–2004 wave (Wave 4). Thus, the discrepant findings do not appear to be solely due to differences between measures or religious traditions nor due to the different indicators of political interest in different studies.

Another explanation may be that different aspects of religiosity have unique relationships with democratic norms. Indeed, there seems to be no universally accepted standard for conceptualizing religiosity. In various studies, religion is defined and measured as religious devotion (See Table 1, rows 14, 15), belonging to a religious association (rows 5, 13) or active religious membership (row 18) including participation in organized religious activities (rows 11, 12, 16), or a combination of these or other religiosity indicators (rows 3, 4, 9, 10). It appears that the relationship between religion and interest in politics is mostly positive if an indicator of participation in religious social activities is used (rows 11–13, 16, 18). However, in some studies, a negative relationship between interest in politics and measures that include religious service attendance is also observed (rows 3–5).

More generally, our previous research has demonstrated that taking a multidimensional approach to religiosity could explain the inconsistent findings in the literature regarding support for the democratic system (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Ben-Nun Bloom, Zemach, & Arian, 2011), tolerance (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, & Courtemanche, 2015), political protest (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019a), and support for redistribution (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019b; Beery & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015). This multidimensional approach suggests that different dimensions or expressions of religion—that is, elements pertaining to different facets of religious experience—potentially lie in tension with each other within a single individual. For example, religious belief is strongly connected to values that promote conservation of the social order, such as tradition and conformity to social norms, and therefore reduces an individual's protest potential. On the other hand, attending religious social activities contributes positively to political protest by increasing the salience of group interests, recruiting the devout to engage in the political process, and making participants more likely to acquire civic skills (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019a).

Thus, adapting a multidimensional approach to religiosity by distinguishing between its belief and social behavior dimensions may explain the inconsistent findings regarding religiosity and interest in politics in Table 1. Religious belief is typically related to concern with the divine rather than with worldly affairs, which may draw believers away from political affairs. On the other hand, participation in religious social activities may have a positive influence on interest in politics, as religious leaders or social networks mobilize believers, increase political awareness, and increase the political salience of group identities (Djupe & Grant, 2001; Manglos & Weinreb, 2013; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Putnam & Campbell, 2010).

In fact, separating the religiosity index used in the analysis in Figure 1 above into religious belief and religious social behavior produces more consistent results. Figure 2 shows the partial correlation coefficients between interest in politics and religious belief (blue bars) and religious social behavior (red bars) when holding constant the other dimension. The bars on the left show the partial correlation coefficients for countries surveyed in 2010–14 (Wave 6), and the three bars on the right show the pooled correlation coefficients in the last three waves of WVS.

As can be seen in Figure 2, religious belief is negatively associated with interest in politics in 13 of the 16 countries (seven of the cases are statistically significant) and in all of the pooled waves in consideration. In 12 out of 16 countries (five significant) as well as in all of the pooled waves religious social behavior is positively associated with interest in politics. Furthermore, in 13 out of these 16 countries, religious belief is more negatively associated with interest in politics than religious social behavior. This illustrates that the effect of religiosity on interest in politics could be vastly different, depending on which dimension of religiosity is being considered. Thus, a multidimensional approach to religiosity is capable of reconciling discrepant findings regarding the association between religiosity and democratic commitment. Nevertheless, there is still unexplained variance that cannot be attributed to differences in measures of religiosity or of political interest.




Figure 2. Partial correlation coefficients between religious belief, religious social behavior, and interest in politics among Catholics in Catholic-majority countries. Entries are partial correlation coefficients between interest in politics and religious belief and religious social behavior when controlling for the effect of the other dimension for Catholic respondents in Catholic countries. Data comes from WVS. The per country results in the left-hand side are from data collected between 2010 and 2014 (Wave 6), and the right-hand side presents results from pooled analysis of Waves 4, 5, and 6. Religious belief is an additive index of (1) whether the respondent considers herself religious and (2) the importance of god in respondent's life (both items carry equal weight), and religious social behavior is an additive index of (1) frequency of attendance to places of worship and (2) membership of a religious organization (both items carry equal weight). Political interest is a 4-point Likert item asking respondents their level of interest in politics. A darker tone indicates $p < .05$. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

In addition, existing research shows that the patterns for the effect of religious belief and religious social behavior are not necessarily systematic across all democratic norms. For example, some studies have found that religious belief is negatively associated with political engagement (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019a; Harris, 1994; Scheufele et al., 2003) or support for democracy (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012, 2013a, 2013b), while others have found it to be positively associated with some elements of democratic endorsement such as institutional trust (Devos, Spini, & Schwartz, 2002; Kasselstrand, Couse, & Sanchez, 2017) and tolerance (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015). Similarly, while the social dimension of religion is associated with political engagement and with support for democracy (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019a; Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Norris, 2002; Putnam & Campbell, 2010), it also drives some antidemocratic norms such as intolerance (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Green, Guth, Kellstedt, & Smidt, 1994; Stouffer, 1955) or support for political violence (Atran & Ginges, 2012; Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009).

To summarize, the literature is replete with contradictory findings, and these inconsistencies do not disappear when accounting for religious affiliation or differences in measures used in different studies. Conceptualizing religious experience as a multidimensional phenomenon explains some of the discrepant findings, yet unsystematic patterns still emerge. This suggests that it might not be religious belief or religious social behavior per se that sustains or disrupts democratic commitment, but rather the psychological mechanisms underlying them (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Djupe & Calfano, 2012a, 2013). There is thus a need for a unifying approach to religiosity—one that takes

into account the mechanisms that may underlie its various effects on democratic norms and political behavior.

The rest of the article proceeds as follows. We first present an overview of the current approaches and challenges in the study of religion and democratic commitment. Many approaches view religiosity through one particular lens, stressing a specific expression of religiosity. We present these accounts in the subsection *Unidimensional Approaches*. Others have noted that what matters is not just how religious one is, but also how one is religious (e.g., Leege & Kellstedt, 1993). Such approaches sought to model various expressions of religion and account for the competing effects of these different expressions. We present these studies in the subsection *Multidimensional Approaches*. Finally, building on the previous contributions, we propose a *Motivational Goal-Constructs* approach, the *Religious Motivations and Expressions (REME) model*, and apply it to religion and democracy. We suggest that expression of religion in terms of beliefs, social behavior, and private behavior may be the manifestation of more than one religious motivation and propose that these alternative motivations may be responsible for the inconsistent findings in the literature. To provide a theoretical framework for this account, we start by asking what draws people to religion and then present a motivational model that applies the notion of goal constructs to religion. Identifying the set of motivations driving different manifestations of religiosity has the potential to disentangle the complex relationships observed between religion and support for democratic norms by highlighting the motivational force of religion and its manifestation in democratic attitudes and behaviors. The result is a fuller picture of the *Homo religiosus* in politics.

Unidimensional Approaches to Religiosity and Democratic Commitment

The healthy functioning of a democracy is contingent on the public's democratic commitment (Almond & Verba, 1963; Diamond, 1999; Easton, 1975; Lipset, 1981). Researchers have therefore devoted considerable effort to identifying the individual-level correlates of endorsement of democratic norms, with religiosity being one of the primary targets. Democratic commitment is reflected in (1) support for the democratic system and its institutions and (2) commitment to democratic principles, primarily pertaining to (a) political engagement and (b) support for political equality, including political tolerance, which refers to willingness to extend political rights to those with whom one disagrees (cf. Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981). Given the vast literature on religion and tolerance, our discussion focuses on the literature on religion and support for the democratic system and political engagement and offers just a few examples from the massive body of work on religion and political tolerance. We also leave for future work to review approaches that focus primarily on outcomes such as political extremism, social tolerance, political violence, prejudice, and religious radicalization.

In exploring the effect of religiosity on democratic commitment, some approaches view religiosity through one particular lens, without accounting for additional facets of the religious experience. Below, we review this line of work.

Religious Teachings

Some studies explain the connection between religiosity and democratic orientations with reference to logical connections between the content of religious beliefs and the democratic norms in question. As early as the 19th century, Tocqueville argued that the Catholic doctrine of social justice, with its emphasis on equality, and the Protestant emphasis on individualism encouraged democratic sentiments among the masses. Similar ideas concerning the effect of commitment to specific religious teachings were more recently echoed by Huntington (1996a, 1996b) and Fukuyama (1992)

who argued that Christian teachings have various democratic elements, such as the separation of religious and secular authority and that Islamic teachings have antidemocratic elements.

Applying these arguments to the realm of public opinion, numerous studies have examined whether religious commitment or espousal of religious teaching among Muslims were associated with lower levels of support for democratic institutions (for a review, see Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2020). Most of this work yielded null or inconclusive results. For example, a pooled analysis of data from 12 Arab countries suggested that, contrary to conventional wisdom, support for sharia laws increased support for democracy (Berger, 2019; the opposite effect was found for belief that sharia constitutes the word of God in this study), while other analyses of data from different samples of Arab countries showed that it is negatively associated with democratic support (Spierings, 2014) and with openness to diverse political ideas (Tessler, Jamal, & Robbins, 2012).

Commitment to religious teachings may influence the endorsement of some democratic norms. For example, Quran reading was positively associated with participation in Arab Spring protests in Egypt and Tunisia (Hoffman & Jamal, 2014). However, this association is not usually borne out in other empirical research. For example, studies of Muslim extremists and terrorists in the Western world as well as in Pakistan, Palestine, Sri Lanka, and Turkey indicate that knowledge of religious teachings or texts rarely have direct influence on violent or extremist attitudes and behavior (Atran, 2010; Bloom, 2007). Religious teachings are often interpreted differently by religious leaders to justify different ends (Fox, 2004; Philpott, 2007). Even the literate devout who directly consult religious texts often employ motivated cognition in their choice between a rich array of teachings. Individuals often find scriptural justification for hatred and conflict as well as tolerance and love, depending on their personal orientations, circumstances, and motivations (Wright, 2009). In addition, constant priming of such messages through the communication of religious elites or through reading the holy texts and scriptures may be necessary for religious teachings to exert a consistent influence on support for democratic principles (cf. Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2013b).

Personalities, Traits, and Personal Values

Some studies explain the connection between religiosity and democratic orientations with reference to people's personality traits or personal values. For instance, the classic authoritarian personality perspective argued that personal religious inclinations are connected to the rejection of democratic norms (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1996). According to this account, religiosity is strongly associated with authoritarian tendencies that prioritize social order and deference to authority at the expense of individual autonomy and preference for diversity (Feldman, 2003; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Such a disposition runs counter to the liberal-democratic ideals of dissent and diversity (Markoff, 2011). Indeed, there is evidence that religion's effect on the rejection of democratic values is mediated through authoritarian orientations (Canetti-Nisim, 2004; Canetti-Nisim & Beit-Hallahmi, 2007; Sullivan et al., 1981).

An alternative approach examines individual differences in religious fundamentalism, or the religious manifestation of the "closed mind" (Rokeach, 1960). Religious fundamentalism has proved to be highly relevant in explaining intergroup attitudes including prejudice in Western contexts (for both majority religion samples in Canada and the United States and Muslim minorities in Europe; Altemeyer, 1996; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1995; Koopmans, 2015; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002) and is strongly associated with political intolerance (in Canada and the United States; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; McFarland, 1989). The connection between religious fundamentalism and prejudice and intolerance is attributed to a variety of factors, including insistence on one, infallible, revealed truth of the Scriptures (Eisenstein, 2006; Jelen & Wilcox, 1989; Rokeach, 1960; Wald, Owen, & Hill, 1989) and biblical literalism (Jelen, 1989; Wilcox & Jelen, 1990; Wilcox, Jelen, & Leege, 1993). In the United States, fundamentalist believers who regard the

Bible as the true word of God reject unbiblical lifestyles and values and are unwilling to extend civil liberties and political rights to groups that do not follow these teachings (Green et al., 1994; Jelen & Wilcox, 1990; Wilcox & Jelen, 1990). In fact, some of the variance in political intolerance across religious traditions in the United States is attributed to the high levels of biblical literalism observed among the members of some traditions such as evangelicals (Kellstedt, Green, Guth, & Smidt, 1996).

According to this perspective, the link between religious fundamentalism and political intolerance is typically attributed not to religion itself but to the strong association between religious fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) as well as other related traits such as need for cognitive closure (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Saroglou, 2002a). Some have even argued that the effect of religion on political intolerance in the United States may be spurious, and completely due to personal orientations such as threat perceptions and insecure personality (Eisenstein, 2006, 2008), as most Christian theologians and churches in the United States now accept that “the form of government most compatible with the Christian religion is democracy” (Kraynak, 2001, p. 1).

Related approaches examining religion and democracy focus on religion as a system of values, demonstrating a value conflict between religiosity and democracy. Cross-national studies show that religiosity is associated with the personal values of tradition, conformity, and security (e.g., Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004; Saroglou & Munoz-Garcia, 2008; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), while democracy encourages essentially the opposite set of values such as autonomy and self-direction (e.g., Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2007; Schwartz & Sagie, 2000), which are positively associated with support for civil liberties (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010). Large-N, cross-national studies further provide evidence that emancipative values, which prioritize liberty and civil rights, are associated negatively with religiosity but are strongly related to support for democracy and to the rejection of authoritarian forms of governance (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2006).

Overall, unidimensional approaches to religion that link personality traits or certain values to religion have been fruitful in detailing some of the mechanisms underlying the effect of religiosity on democratic commitment. However, they provide a partial explanation of the religiosity-democracy nexus as they focus on individual-level predispositions and mostly leave out the social-behavioral and group components of the religious experience.

Religious Participation

A vast literature examines the relationship between religious participation on political engagement. Studies focusing on the United States have concluded that religious social behavior, which consists of attending religious services, participating in activities organized by places of worship, and having a religious social network, positively affects political participation through the civic skills and social capital acquired as a result of these activities (Alex-Assensoh & Assensoh, 2001; Gerber, Gruber, & Hungerman, 2016; Lewis, MacGregor, & Putnam, 2013; Liu, Austin, & Orey, 2009; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). In addition, some emphasize the effect of religious leadership in mobilizing congregants (Smidt, Kellstedt, & Guth, 2009; Wilcox & Gomez, 1990) while others argue that social influence is the key to increased levels of political activity (Djupe & Gilbert, 2009; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wilcox & Sigelman, 2001).

The association between religious social behavior and political participation is one of the most robust findings in the literature, especially in the United States. However, the exact causal mechanisms that connect religious participation to political engagement are still somewhat unclear. It is also likely that the positive association is due to some common underlying motivation, trait, or orientation. For instance, political or social trust may lead individuals to both participate in religious social activities and actively engage in politics (Norris & Inglehart, 2004).

Additionally, religious social behavior is not always associated with endorsement of democratic norms such as tolerance. Across different countries and members of religious traditions, church attendance is generally negatively related to willingness to extend civil liberties to disliked groups (Beatty & Walter, 1988; Froese, Bader, & Smith, 2008; Karpov, 1999; Reimer & Park, 2001; Stouffer, 1955), potentially via prejudice and intolerance through network discussion (Djupe & Calfano, 2012b; Green et al., 1994). Religious social networks often comprise like-minded individuals (Mutz, 2002), and political talk with like-minded fellow congregates may ossify group boundaries and heighten grievances and perceptions of threat from other groups.

In fact, data from select as well as representative religious congregations in the United States show that political communication within local congregations and places of worship is generally the primary mechanism linking religiosity to a wide range of political orientations in the United States (Djupe & Calfano, 2012a, 2013; Djupe & Gilbert, 2009; Gilbert, 1993; Jelen, 1992; Wald, Owen, & Hill, 1988). Its effect can occur by way of information or opinions communicated by the clergy (Djupe & Hunt, 2009; Fetzer, 2001) or through political discussion between network members (Djupe & Gilbert, 2009; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; for a review, see Ladam, Shapiro, & Sokhey, 2020). More importantly, these dynamics may influence the attitudes and behaviors of the participants above and beyond specific religious teachings. In fact, there is often wide variation in the political orientations of members of the same religious tradition due to localized communication effects (Djupe & Gilbert, 2009; Wald, Owen, & Hill, 1988, 1990). Thus, higher levels of commitment to democratic norms may be fostered and even explained by the orientation of the religious congregation to which an individual belongs. Yet, self-selection in religious networks or congregations has not been adequately investigated. As with religious participation, it is possible that a common underlying mechanism can explain belonging to a specific religious congregation and democratic commitment.

Religion as Social Identity

In addition to supplying values, a belief system, and a network, religion also supplies social and political identity (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Theories of intergroup relations, particularly social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1979), have been applied extensively to the study of religiosity and intergroup relations (e.g., Bekerman & Horenczyk, 2004; Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell, & Hewstone, 2006; Eriksen, 2001; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Rao, 1999). The application of religious identity to the study of democratic commitment has mostly focused on its effects on tolerance and political engagement. These works suggest that religious identities can both promote and hinder democratic commitment.

Studies using data from a large variety of contexts and samples show that religious group identification can boost participation and civic engagement potential by increasing the salience of group interests (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019a; Jamal, 2005; Kanas & Martinovic, 2017; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014; Read, 2015). A similar mechanism applies to the democratic commitment of religious minorities. A strong sense of identity may mobilize minority groups around a common cause, which consequently strengthens group members' participation as well as support for diversity and minority group rights (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, in press). For instance, a strong religious identity among Muslims in Europe is associated with support for cultural diversity and endorsement of Muslims' expressive and political rights (Carol, Helbling, & Michalowski, 2015; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014; Verkuyten, 2017). Yet, strong religious identities are also related to higher levels of perceived threats from outgroups, especially in the context of intergroup conflict, which often leads to social and political intolerance (e.g., Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Djupe & Calfano, 2013; Verkuyten, Maliepaard, Martinovic, & Khoudja, 2014). Thus, as in the case of religious participation, while religious identity can hurt democratic commitment in some contexts, it can enhance

support for democratic norms in other contexts by increasing support for diversity and political equality for religious minorities.

To summarize, unidimensional approaches provide a variety of perspectives to explain the relationship between religiosity and democratic commitment and present a number of contradictory findings which are difficult to resolve when focusing on one single facet of religiosity.

Multidimensional Approaches to Religion and Democratic Commitment

The approaches reviewed above reveal a set of contradictory findings regarding religion's relationship with democratic commitment. This paradox of religion has been noted as early as the 1950s, with Allport and his colleague's conclusion that religion can both make and unmake prejudice (1954, p. 444). Religion's conflicting effects on different social and political outcomes have been captured by such titles as "the ambivalence of the sacred" (Appleby, 2000) and "the political ambivalence of religion" (Philpott, 2007). "Is it possible to say anything general?" wrote Daniel Philpott in his influential article from 2007; "What explains why religion becomes either violent or irenic, a source of terrorism or a contributor to the rule of law?" (p. 505). In dealing with the mounting mixed evidence, these and other scholars built on institutional-level, theology-oriented, and historical explanations. The multidimensional approaches that we review in this section, on the other hand, aim to account for the individual-level complexity of religion.

Multidimensional approaches integrate the various elements of religious experience by conceptualizing religiosity as a multidimensional phenomenon consisting of several related components (Saroglou, 2011; Stark & Glock, 1968; Wald & Smidt, 1993). A popular approach for analyzing the political influence of religion, especially within political science and sociology in the American context is the 3Bs approach, which has been widely used to study partisanship, candidate choice, and policy preferences in the United States (Smidt, 2020) and has also been adopted to study democratic orientations cross-nationally. The 3Bs approach is more of an analytical strategy than a theoretical approach as it does not predict which dimension of religiosity shapes any specific attitude (Smidt, 2020, p. 730). It conceptualizes religiosity as consisting of belief, behavior, and belonging (Guth, Green, Kellstedt, & Smidt, 1995; Layman, 1997, 2001; Wald & Smidt, 1993). The belief dimension refers to an understanding of the divine and to humanity's relationship to it as well as to belief in God, heaven, and hell and the tendency among people to characterize themselves as religious. The behavior dimension consists of private behavior such as prayer or reading of the holy texts and social practice including attending places of worship and participating in organized religious communities and networks. The third dimension, belonging, consists of affiliation with a particular organized religious tradition, denomination, or movement within a denomination (Smidt, 2020).

Multidimensional studies suggest that these different expressions of religiosity may have different and even conflicting effects on endorsement of democratic norms due to their association with different psychological mechanisms (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019a, 2019b; Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Eisenstein, 2006; Eisenstein & Clark, 2017; Verkuyten et al., 2014). In most of these studies, the focus is on the effects of belief and behavior (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019a, 2019b; Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012, 2013a; Meyer, Tope, & Price, 2008), while belonging to a specific religious group (often a religious tradition, denomination, or congregation) is often thought to set the context and affect the political expression of religious belief, identity, and behavior (Kellstedt & Green, 1993; Layman, 1997; Wald & Wilcox, 2006). Below, we review findings within the multidimensional approach and show that this research agenda reveals some consistent associations between religious expressions and endorsement of democratic norms.

Multidimensional Religiosity and Support for the Democratic System

We first summarize findings from studies that considered support for democracy as the dependent variable and that included at least one measure for the social dimension of religiosity and at least one measure that captured the private devotion or belief component of religiosity in the same model.

To produce this comprehensive review, we conducted a search of the literature using keyword searches of electronic databases (Google Scholar, JSTOR) complimented by title searches in the bibliographies of the identified publications. Our search returned 56 publications of which all but two were journal articles. Once the works that did not meet our inclusion criteria were excluded,³ we were left with 10 publications comprising 16 effects which we present in Table 2.

Most of the studies examine overt or generalized support for democracy, that is, deeming democracy as a desirable form of governing the country and rejecting authoritarian alternatives (e.g., rows 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13–15). Overt support was also measured in terms of whether individuals see democracy as an efficient system (rows 6, 8, 12 [reversed]) or are satisfied with democracy's performance (row 3). In contrast, intrinsic or genuine support for democracy, usually distinguished from overt support, refers to substantive support for the principles underlying democratic regimes (Dalton, 1999; Easton, 1975; Norris, 2011). Intrinsic support is operationalized as the endorsement of democratic procedures and norms such as free elections, civil rights, and freedom of speech (noninstrumental support for democracy; row 1 or democratic norms; row 11), or as the rejection of autocratic principles and instrumental motives (row 9).

Our review supports the view that as a belief system, religiosity is associated with opposition to democracy. Thus, when another expression of religion is held constant, the belief component is negatively associated with both overt support (rows 2–8, 10, 16 [reversed]) and intrinsic support for democracy (rows 1, 9, 11). The social expression of religiosity, when another religious expression is held constant, has a less robust effect, showing either a positive effect (overt support: rows 5–8, 10; intrinsic: rows 9, 11), a null effect (overt support: rows 2–4, 12–15), or a negative effect (overt support: row 16 [reversed]; intrinsic support: row 1). Overall, the relationship between the social dimension of religiosity and support for democracy is positive in four of the 10 studies considered, not significant in four, and negative in two of the studies reviewed in Table 2. It is possible that some unexpected effects may be due to variance in situational factors such as religion-state arrangements. For instance, Tezcur et al. (2012) note that because of the politicization of religion by the ruling regime, collective prayers are highly politicized in Iran, and those who attend Friday prayers are more likely to be satisfied with the regime, which explains the negative relationship between religious attendance and support for democracy.

Multidimensional Religiosity and Political Engagement

Multidimensional approaches have also considered the effects of dimensions of religiosity on other elements of democratic commitment, such as political engagement, including electoral and nonelectoral participation in democratic politics. Studies of multidimensional religiosity in the United States generally report a positive association between religious social behavior and political engagement when holding constant another expression of religiosity, usually religious belief, regardless of the religious tradition or denomination of respondents (Barreto & Dana, 2010; Harris, 1994; Jones-Correa & Leal, 2001; Lewis et al., 2013; Read, 2007; Scheufele et al., 2003; Westfall, 2019; Wilcox & Gomez, 1990). Nevertheless, the relationship between religious belief and political

³We excluded studies that did not focus on mass attitudes, did not present empirical analysis, or did not analyze individual-level data. We also excluded studies that did not look at the direct effect of the dimensions of religiosity and those that only used a single indicator of religiosity as explanatory variables.

Table 2. Relationships Between Religious Belief, Religious Social Behavior, and Support for Democracy

#	Dependent Variable	Belief Measure	Belief: Relation to DV	Social Behavior Measure	Social Behavior: Relation to DV	Source	Countries Included/ Data Source
1	Intrinsic support for democracy	Religious belief	Negative	Religious attendance	Negative	Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom (in press)	Multi-country (WVS Waves 5 and 6)
2	Support for democracy as form of government	Belief in God	Negative	Religious attendance	N.S.	Marsh (2005)	Russia (WVS, Wave 3)
3	Index of satisfaction with democratic performance	Index of individual religiosity	Negative	Religious attendance	N.S.	Tezcur, Azadarmaki, Bahar, and Nayebi (2012)	Iran (WVS Wave 5; independent survey)
4	Support for democratic procedures	Religious belief	Negative	Religious social behavior	N.S.	Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2013a)	Multi-country (WVS Wave 5)
5	Support for democracy as a form of government	Religious belief	Negative	Religious social behavior	Positive	Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2012)	Multi-country (WVS, Wave 4)
6	Perceiving democracy as efficient	Religious belief	Negative	Religious social behavior	Positive	Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2012)	Multi-country (WVS, Wave 4)
7	Support for democracy as a form of government	Religious belief	Negative	Religious social behavior	Positive	Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2013a)	Multi-country (WVS Waves 4 and 5)
8	Perceiving democracy as efficient	Religious belief	Negative	Religious social behavior	Positive	Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2013a)	Multi-country (WVS Waves 4 and 5)
9	Noninstrumental support for democracy	Religious belief	Negative	Religious social behavior	Positive	Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2013a)	Multi-country (WVS Wave 5)
10	Support for democracy as a form of government	Religious belief	Negative	Religious social behavior	Positive	Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2013b)	Israel, Turkey (student samples)
11	Support for democratic norms	Doctrinal orthodoxy (Biblical literalism)	Negative	Religious attendance	Positive	Eisenstein and Clark (2017)	United States (Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy Survey)
12	Agreement that democracy brings problems (reversed measure)	Political religiosity	All: N.S.	Religious attendance	Jordan, Morocco, Algeria: N.S. Egypt: Positive	Tessler (2002)	Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria (WVS)
13	Favorable attitudes toward democracy	Political religiosity	Jordan, Morocco, Algeria: N.S. Egypt: Positive	Religious attendance	All: N.S.	Tessler (2002)	Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria (WVS)
14	Valuing having a democratic system	Belief in God	N.S.	Religious attendance	N.S.	Marsh (2005)	Russia (WVS, Wave 3)
15	Support for democracy as form of government	Religious attachment (religiosity items and private prayer)	Positive	Religious attendance	N.S.	Meyer et al. (2008)	Multi-country (WVS Wave 3)
16	Support for Islamic rule (reversed measure)	Religious belief	Positive	Religious attendance	Positive	Tezcur and Azadarmaki (2008)	Survey in Tehran

Note. Table entries are (from left to right) row numbers, measures of support for democracy, the first dimension of religiosity, its relation to the measure of support for democracy considered, the second dimension of religiosity as well as its relation to the measure of support for democracy in question (with N.S. indicating nonsignificant statistical findings), the source, as well as data source/sample information from existing studies. All measures reported in the table indicate higher levels of religious belief and religious attendance or social behavior. All measures of support, with the exception of rows #12 and #16 indicate higher levels of support for democracy.

engagement when holding the effect of the social dimension of religiosity constant has been mixed. For instance, measures of religious belief such as belief in heaven, belief in hell, and religious orthodoxy were not significantly related to participating in different types of political activities among both Christians and non-Christians in the United States when partialing out the effect of religious attendance (Lewis et al., 2013). Similarly, when controlling for the effect of religious social behavior, the frequency of prayer or subjective religiosity did not significantly affect political participation among African Americans (Wilcox & Gomez, 1990) as well as among Muslim Americans (Barreto & Dana, 2010; Read, 2007). Still, some studies in the American context report a negative relationship between religious belief and political engagement. For example, when holding church attendance constant, doctrinal commitment was found to be correlated negatively with an index of participation in various activities in support of a political candidate or party (Scheufele et al., 2003). In contrast, another study reported that an index of internal religiosity consisting of private prayer, feelings of closeness to God, and strength of religious affiliation had a positive effect on political action potential when controlling for the effect of church attendance in the United States (Harris, 1994).

Our large-N cross-national study found that religious social behavior increased and religious belief decreased tendency to participate in nonelectoral political action (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019a). This finding corroborates the influence of religious networks and places of worship in mobilizing its members, as well as the traditional orientations underlying religious belief across several countries. We also found that the positive effects of religious social behavior on political protest were stronger in countries with higher levels of government regulation of religion, arguably because those who participate in religious social activities are more devoted to religious communal causes where religious social activities carries greater costs.

Multidimensional Religiosity and Political Tolerance

In considering tolerance, multidimensional studies show that when measures of religious belief are held constant, religious social behavior is associated with higher levels of prejudice and intolerance (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Djupe & Calfano, 2012a; Scheepers, Gijberts, & Hello, 2002; Spierings, 2019; Stewart, Edgell, & Delehanty, 2018). In contrast, the belief and private behavior dimensions are often positively related to political tolerance when the social behavior dimension is held constant (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015). This pattern of results emerges in a range of cross-national studies that use data from various sources including the World Value Survey, the Arab Barometer Survey, and the European Values Survey (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Doebler, 2014; Hoffman, 2020; Scheepers et al., 2002; Spierings, 2019) and when considering various measures for religiosity. These findings qualify some unidimensional studies that often found a negative relationship between the belief dimension and political tolerance when the social dimension is not partialled out.

Although these effects are fairly robust, a few studies focusing on the United States produced opposite findings. For example, Burge (2013) has found biblical literalism to be negatively and church attendance to be positively related to political tolerance when the other dimension is controlled for. Eisenstein (2006) found doctrinal orthodoxy to be negatively associated with tolerance when controlling for the effect of religious attendance. Similarly, Gibson (2013) has shown that born-again beliefs were often unrelated to political tolerance when the effect of church attendance was controlled for.

Thus, while many studies have found that social behavior is associated with less tolerance and belief is associated with more tolerance, some opposite findings exist as well. This suggests that the associations of tolerance with belief and behavior are not necessarily psychologically basic and may be due to underlying mechanisms and contextual effects.

Challenges to the Multidimensional Approaches

The multidimensional approaches have contributed greatly to our understanding of how religion is connected to democratic commitment by accounting for the differential effects of various expressions of religiosity. Still, the multidimensional approaches are not a panacea to the puzzle of religiosity and democratic commitment. There is no conclusive evidence concerning the overall normative effect of the different religiosity dimensions on democratic norms.⁴ More often than not, the social component of religiosity is associated with *normatively desirable* democratic outcomes (such as political engagement and support for democracy), when holding constant beliefs, whereas religious beliefs are associated with *normatively undesirable* outcomes (particularly decreased engagement and support for democracy), when attendance is held constant. However, the opposite is true for other democratic norms, such as political tolerance. Thus, religious practice does not make perfect: Religious identities made salient by religious attendance may be detrimental to tolerance, while some beliefs may increase it.

One possibility is that there is a complex set of drivers underlying each one of the religious dimensions. A single religious expression can be connected to different psychological mechanisms, which may be in conflict with each other. For example, religious belief carries with it a number of different and even opposing values and motivations. On the one hand, all major religious faiths promote prosocial orientations, such as compassion and empathy, that may foster democratic norms, such as tolerance (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019b; also see Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2020; Be'ery & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015). Spiritual striving may lead believers to pursue the perspective of God and can point them toward compassion and empathy, with potential implications for support for human rights and diversity (Malka & Soto, 2011). On the other hand, religious belief is associated with values that emphasize tradition, conservation, and security (e.g., Jost et al., 2014; Saroglou, 2002a, 2002b) as well as with religious fundamentalism (Hunsberger, 1995), which are associated with antidemocratic orientations, such as rejection of democracy as a system.

Another possibility is that in some instances increased political engagement or support for democracy are not necessarily normatively desirable. While most empirical scholarship considers political engagement to have important implications for civic competence and democratic citizenship (Almond & Verba, 1963), political engagement may not necessarily be directed towards democratic ends, such as when people vote for authoritarian candidates or support antidemocratic goals or movements (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2013a). Similarly, while religious social behavior increases overt support for democracy, it has a negative effect on genuine democratic commitment, which include aspects of political equality and freedom of speech (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, in press).

Disentangling the set of mechanisms underlying each religious expression is important, as they may cancel each other out when considering the overall effect of the specific religious expression on an attitude (see e.g., Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019b; Be'ery & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Malka, Soto, Cohen, & Miller, 2011). In addition, the psychological drivers of the religious expression illuminate the intentions underlying the expressed political behavior.

Nevertheless, there is no unified approach that accounts for the various mechanisms and expressions underlying the effect of religiosity. While different multidimensional approaches have some components in common, there is substantial variability in how these dimensions are defined and conceptualized and which mechanisms are deemed important. Even more importantly, the literature

⁴As we discuss in previous sections, the context can be a moderating influence (also see Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019a, 2019b; Fox, Bader, & McClurer, 2019; Karakoc & Baskan, 2012; Storm, 2016). Still, holding constant the context does not change the fact that each one of the religious dimensions is sometimes negatively and sometimes positively related to democratic norms, as this result emerges in single-country studies as well as in comparative works, and does not inherently change the fact that a single religious expression is sometimes channeled by several conflicting psychological mechanisms.

currently employs an eclectic set of psychological drivers potentially underlying the effect of various expressions of religiosity on democratic norms. The current diversity often seems to muddy the waters rather than to offer a solution to the puzzle of how religion is related to democratic commitment.

Further, the psychological mechanisms underlying the potential moderating effects of religious belonging and religious context are not well defined or explored. Belonging and religious context are thought to influence what kind of beliefs or behaviors are more likely to be expressed (Kellstedt & Green, 1993; Layman, 1997; Wald & Wilcox, 2006). Still, there has been much less systematic theorizing of how such moderating factors affect the role of religious expressions in politics.⁵

We propose that examining the motivational role of religion, above and beyond a particular religious tradition or context, has the potential to resolve these issues. We suggest that a variety of motivations may underlie religious expressions. For instance, in the case of religious belief, some mechanisms may promote tolerance and others may emphasize tradition and be resistant to change. To elucidate these mechanisms, we propose a motivational approach to religion.

A Motivational Approach to Religion: The Religious Motivations and Expressions Model (REME)

Motivation underlies a broad range of psychological phenomena, including reasoning (Kunda, 1990), attitude stability and change (Katz, 1960), self-regulation (Thrash & Elliot, 2001), and acculturation (Gezentsvey & Ward, 2008; Toth-Bos, Wisse, & Farago, 2019). Indeed, the study of motivation and goals is not foreign to the study of religion (e.g., Emmons, 1986; Gorlow & Schroeder, 1968; Pargament & Park, 1995). Even so, the work on goal constructs and motivation to be religious has never been integrated with the literature on religious expressions.

Tying together the literature on motivations for being religious and the multidimensional approaches to religion, we suggest that expressions of religion, including religious beliefs, social behavior, and private behavior, may be the manifestation of more than one religious motivation. These alternative motivations may be responsible for some of the inconsistencies in past findings. Specifically, each expression of religion may be underlied by various social, humanistic, and moral motivations. For instance, religious beliefs might pertain to traditional values and the desire to maintain the status quo, as well as to a desire for the sacred. Similarly, religious social behavior might pertain to the need to socialize and to do good within one's community in order to develop a positive reputation, as well as to preserve the group's place in the social hierarchy. To provide a theoretical framework for this account, we make use of the concept of goal constructs, or the mental representation of goals with their congruent means (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2002). Below, we expand on the notion of goal constructs and then apply them to religion in order to provide a framework for the links between religion and democratic norms.

Goal Constructs

Disparate motivations can have downstream consequences for actions because the actions for attaining different motivations vary (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2002). For example, an individual's goal to have meaningful relationships with others may be facilitated by taking part in communal activities, whereas the same individual's goal to have a meaningful relationship with God may be facilitated by engaging in private prayer. Consequently, the different expressions of

⁵Fragmentation of religious affiliations is another problem. Cross-national works in religion and democratic norms often classify various religious groups under major religious traditions, but there are often major differences in how religious teachings of the same religion are interpreted across contexts. Even more fine-grained classifications at the national level may ignore consequential diversity in congregations or local religious organizations (Djupe & Gilbert, 2009). It thus may be helpful to focus on elements that may be universal and that commonly apply between cultures and religious denominations.

religion, such as belief, social behavior, or private behavior, may be driven by motivations for being religious (henceforth referred to as *religious motivation*). However, the correspondence between religious motivations and expressions of religiosity may not be one to one. Each religious motivation may be facilitated by a set of religious expressions, a goal systems architecture termed *multifinality* (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Kruglanski, Babush, Dugas, & Schumpe, 2015). In addition, each expression of religion may facilitate a set of religious motivations, a goal systems architecture termed *equifinality* (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2012; Kruglanski, Chernikova, Babush, Dugas, & Schumpe, 2015). Thus, a particular expression of religion may be underlied by more than one religious motivation. As a result, contradictory or inconsistent findings regarding the association between a particular expression of religion and democratic norms may reflect several motivations underlying that expression of religion. To illustrate possible links between motivations in religion and expressions of religiosity, we integrate two independent lines of research in the psychology of religion: what people's motivations are for being religious and the multidimensional approach to religion, which describes how religiosity is expressed. Based on the integration of these two lines of research, and informed by theories of goal constructs, we develop the Religious Motivations and Expressions model, or REME model.

Applying Goal Constructs to Religion

The centrality of goals in understanding religion has a long and distinguished history, dating back to the work of Gordon Allport (see Schnitker & Emmons, 2013). Several reviews have identified a set of motivations in being religious (e.g., van Bruggen, 2019; Gorlow & Schroeder, 1968; Neyrinck, Lens, & Vansteenkiste, 2005; Pargament & Park, 1995), although these reviews do not purport to be comprehensive and are not substantiated by a thorough empirical investigation. In the absence of an existing theoretical or empirical integration of motivations in religion, we culled the literature for the most frequently discussed motivations in religion. Common religious motivations, appearing in at least three of four reviews (van Bruggen, 2019; Gorlow & Schroeder, 1968; Neyrinck et al., 2005; Pargament & Park, 1995), include seeking purpose or meaning, seeking the sacred, and affiliating with others. In addition, empirical research has demonstrated that religiosity is associated with conservation motives, such as maintaining tradition (Saroglou et al., 2004; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). Finally, religious identity is an influential type of social identity which people are motivated to view favorably, vis-à-vis the perception of outgroups as unfavorable, with the hope of preserving the group's social status (Ysseldyk et al., 2010).

Below, we lay out possible associations between these five motivations and three expressions of religion: *belief*, *social behavior*, and *private behavior* (see Figure 3). We differentiate between social behavior, such as attending religious services and communal events, and private behavior, such as private meditation and prayer. This distinction is based on previous work that found that those behaviors are associated with different, and sometimes opposite, outcomes (e.g., Ginges et al., 2009; Hoffman, 2020) and allows discerning the manner in which individuals are religious (Smidt, 2020).

We view religious belonging (Guth et al., 1995; Wald & Smidt, 1993) as a factor that may condition the very association between religious motivations and the three religious expressions, as the affiliation with congregation or denomination captures what beliefs and practices people might be committed to and how strongly (Djupe, 2018, p. 437). Given that religious affiliation is largely a reflection of the religious background of one's family (Bengston, Putney, & Harris, 2013),⁶ it is relatively inflexible and therefore less likely to be characterized by individual differences in motivations.

⁶While in some countries such as the United States, it is not uncommon for some people to leave their childhood religion and switch to another religious faith, in some other countries switching religious traditions or congregations is rare (Barro, Hwang, & McCleary, 2010).




Figure 3. Possible associations between religious motivations and religious expressions in the REME model. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Thus, belonging influences what kind of beliefs or behaviors are more likely to be expressed by affiliates of different religious groups, how strongly they will be expressed, and consequently how these beliefs will relate to political attitudes and behaviors. For instance, we suggest below that adherence to religious beliefs is instrumental to maintaining tradition because religious beliefs demonstrate a commitment to the orthodox aspects of religion. However, given that adherence to belief is the standard by which Christians judge others to be religious (Cohen, Siegel, & Rozin, 2003), such an association may be specific to Christians. Among Jews, for whom behavior is the standard by which religiosity is judged, maintaining tradition may be associated more strongly with public and private behaviors than with belief. Given that we are building on the existing literature in formulating predictions regarding links between religious motivations and expressions, our predictions necessarily reflect this bias in the literature towards adherents of Protestantism and Catholicism. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the possibility that links between religious motivations and expressions may be moderated by belonging to different religious affiliations.

Associations Between Motivations in Religion and Expressions of Religion

In what follows, we characterize the five different religious motivations we have identified in the literature. First, a search for purpose and meaning is facilitated by the pursuit of projects that give value and meaning in life by investing in and committing to them (Ryff & Singer, 1998). Projects that foster purpose and meaning have been identified in many domains, including personal accomplishments, parenthood, and being in loving relationships (Nozick, 1989). Purpose and meaning are also facilitated by a sense that the world is coherent and consists of reliable patterns (Heintzelman, Trent, & King, 2013). In the religious domain, purpose and meaning may be fostered by all three expressions of religion, as illustrated in Figure 3. First, just as a sense of coherence facilitates purpose and meaning in life (Heintzelman et al., 2013), so can a religious belief system that provides an interpretive framework for personal and global events provide purpose and meaning (Baumeister, 1991; Park, 2005). For instance, the idea that suffering is redemptive can add purpose and meaning to one who is in constant physical or emotional pain (Vishkin et al., 2019). Consequently, searching

for purpose and meaning may be facilitated by adhering to religious beliefs. Second, because consensus may serve as an epistemic authority, such meaning systems are strengthened when they are validated by others (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Stark & Finke, 2000). Furthermore, affiliating with members of a religious community provides the opportunity to develop meaningful relationships with others. Consequently, searching for purpose and meaning may be facilitated by social behavior. Indeed, given that meaning in religion is related to the presence of communal relationships and social support (Krause, 2008), adherents of a religion may seek such communal relationships to satisfy their motivation to have a sense of meaning and purpose. Finally, a sense of purpose or meaning in life may be facilitated by developing a sense of building a relationship with the sacred (Emmons, 2005). Private devotional practices, such as prayer, afford such an opportunity. Overall, searching for purpose and meaning is likely to be expressed in the religious expression of belief, social behavior, and private behavior.

Seeking the sacred refers to the motivation to experience a relationship with God or with a divine figure (Gorlow & Schroeder, 1968; Neyrinck et al., 2005). Seeking the sacred has been referred to as the central motivation of religion (Pargament & Park, 1995), and it is a strong predictor of a variety of religious expressions (Welch & Barrish, 1982). Such a motivation is likely to be facilitated by expressions of religion that connect adherents to God or the divine. These expressions may include contemplating the nature of God or engaging in private prayer and devotion. These behaviors are components of both belief and private behavior, respectively. However, we do not expect them to be connected to social behavior. Social behavior may facilitate or hamper an individual's inclination to seek the sacred. On the one hand, rituals such as communal prayer may foster a feeling that one is connecting to God and his flock. On the other hand, insofar as religious social behavior is anathema to connecting to the divine (Allport & Ross, 1967), and perhaps particularly so among Protestants (Cohen & Hill, 2007), social behavior may hinder the motivation to seek the sacred. Indeed, individuals highly motivated to seek God are less likely to participate in religious study groups and religious social groups (Gorlow & Schroeder, 1968). Accordingly, the motivation to seek the sacred may be more related to belief and private behavior and, at least among Protestants, less related to social behavior.

Affiliation refers to the motivation to be close to others, for the purpose of attaining intimacy, developing social contacts (Neyrinck et al., 2005), or overcoming an existential fear of isolation (van Bruggen, 2019). Such a motivation is likely to be facilitated by expressions of religion that connect adherents to others. These expressions may include components of social behavior, such as attendance in religious services or communal events. In addition, such a motivation may have little bearing on expressions of religion that are not social, such as belief and private behavior. Consequently, the motivation to affiliate may be more related to social behavior and less related to belief and private behavior.

Maintaining tradition refers to the motivation to submit to transcendental authority by respecting and committing to the dictates of one's culture or religion (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Huisman, 1995). Of the 10 values in Schwartz's circumplex model, religiosity is most strongly tied to tradition (Schwartz & Huisman, 1995). The motivation to maintain tradition is likely to be facilitated by expressions of religion that demonstrate commitment to orthodox aspects of religion, such as adherence to religious beliefs. Studies show that tradition values (or their proxies, e.g., conservatism) mediate the effect of religious belief on different political orientations (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019b; Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2013a). Maintaining tradition is distinct from valuing conformity, which is related more to observing cultural and religious practices and behaviors (Schwartz & Huisman, 1995). Therefore, we suggest that the motivation to maintain tradition may be more related to belief and less related to social behavior and private behavior.

Social enhancement refers to the motivation to commit to one's ingroups or by denigrating outgroups, for the purpose of achieving and maintaining positive self-concept (Tajfel, 1979) or of viewing oneself favorably (Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010). The motivation for social enhancement may lead

to prejudiced attitudes towards religious outgroups or ethnic minorities. In a religious context, such a motivation is likely to be facilitated by public expressions of religion that have direct social implications, such as attending religious services or participating in communal religious events. This motivation is relevant in contexts where intergroup relations are salient; therefore, it is less salient when an individual is with oneself or in communion with God. Consequently, the motivation for social enhancement may be more related to social behavior and less related to belief and private behavior.

According to this model, all the expressions of religion are equifinal; that is, behind each expression lies more than one motivation (Figure 3). Thus, religious belief is equifinal for (i.e., simultaneously helps attain) the motivations of searching for significance, seeking the sacred, and maintaining tradition. Social behavior is equifinal for the motivations of searching for significance, affiliation, and social enhancement. Private behavior is equifinal for the motivations of searching for significance and seeking the sacred. To the extent that each set of motivations exerts different effects on attitudes and behavior, assessing the association between social or political constructs and religious expressions may lead to highly variable findings. In this sense, expressions of religion are observed proxies for underlying motivations and are partly reducible to them. Nevertheless, their inclusion in the model adds explanatory and predictive value for several reasons. First, the inclusion of religious expressions in the model facilitates interpreting previous research which has focused on religious expressions. Second, they are the observable characteristics of religion and therefore need to be accounted for. Third, their absence can affect the link between religious motivations and democratic commitment. For example, a person with a motivation to affiliate may engage in more social behavior, such as taking part in communal events, which may increase her political involvement. Absent the existence of a religious community, that motivation will not translate into greater political involvement.

Below, we expand on how the motivations underlying the various religious expressions may lead to such variable findings for the endorsement of democratic norms.

REME and Democratic Commitment: Testable Propositions

The multidimensional approaches to religion that were presented above have been effective in clarifying the relationship between religion and democratic commitment, particularly when distinguishing between belief and social behavior. Nevertheless, as we have also shown, both religious belief and social behavior are associated negatively with some democratic norms and positively with some others. According to the REME model, these inconsistent findings may reflect the different motivations underlying each expression of religiosity. In what follows, we present specific and readily testable propositions to explain the inconsistent findings regarding democratic norms and religious belief and social behavior, respectively. These propositions do not exhaust the insights that may be gleaned from applying the REME model to religion and democratic commitment. Instead, they are meant reflect the unique explanatory power of the model in addressing inconsistent findings that exist in the literature.

Proposition 1: The effect of belief on political engagement and tolerance. Inconsistent findings pertaining to religious belief and support for some democratic norms reflect the tension between the motivations to seek the sacred and to maintain tradition.

According to the model, belief is linked to the motivations to seek the sacred, maintain tradition, and search for purpose. The motivation to seek the sacred can account for the positive association between belief and political tolerance (e.g., Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015). In seeking the sacred, one's thoughts are focused on God, and focusing on God's perspective is associated with more prosociality (Preston & Ritter, 2013), less parochialism (Ginges, Sheikh, Atran, & Argo, 2016), and less

dehumanization (Pasek et al., 2020). In contrast, the negative association between religious belief and tolerance (Burge, 2013; Eisenstein, 2006; Gibson, 2013) can be attributed to the motivation to maintain tradition, which may arouse intolerance towards those who carry the opposite value system, such as religious outgroups, homosexuals, or atheists. The motivation to maintain tradition can also predict weaker support for democracy due to the tension between traditional values and democratic values of openness to change (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012, 2013a, b). The inconsistent associations between belief and support for democratic norms are rendered interpretable once the motivations underlying belief are accounted for.

Proposition 2: The effect of social behavior on political engagement and tolerance. Inconsistent findings between social behavior and support for democratic norms may reflect the tension between the motivations to affiliate and the motivation for social enhancement.

According to the model, social behavior is linked to the motivations to affiliate, to socially enhance, and to search for purpose. Other things being equal, the motivation to affiliate can promote participation in religious social networks, which tends to increase group consciousness and foster civic skills, leading to active engagement in the political process and promoting positive attitudes towards democracy (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012, 2013a). Therefore, the positive association between social behavior and political participation (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019a; Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012, 2013a, b) can be accounted for by the motivation to affiliate with others.⁷ The motivations to affiliate with others and to socially enhance are both social motivations, yet they may exert opposite effects on the expanse of one's sociomoral circle (Waytz, Iver, Young, Haidt, & Graham, 2019). The motivation to affiliate may expand the social circle with which one is concerned by expanding one's social network, while the motivation to socially enhance may limit the social circle with which one is concerned by dividing one's social world into groups organized hierarchically. As with belief, the inconsistent associations between social behavior and support for democratic norms can be more clearly explained and interpreted once the motivations underlying religious social behavior are accounted for.

Proposition 3: The effect of belief, private behavior, and social behavior on interest in politics. The variable associations between interest in politics and religious expressions reflect a set of associations with underlying motivations: Affiliation and social enhancement predict more interest in politics, maintaining tradition predicts more interest for issues that are pertinent to conservative values, seeking the sacred predicts less interest in politics, and the influence of searching for purpose is variable.

In the first two propositions, we discussed specific associations between religious motivations and democratic norms relating to political engagement and tolerance. Returning to our running example presented at the outset, we now discuss predicted associations between each of the motivations and interest in politics. First, religious belief can yield a positive, negative, or null effect on interest in politics, holding the other expressions constant, depending on which motivation is most salient. Thus, the effect of religious belief on interest in politics may be due to three underlying motivations: the motivation to maintain tradition, which increases interest to the extent that the particular

⁷Still, political engagement is sometimes not directed toward democratic ends. Specifically, the motivation to socially enhance can hurt democratic commitment by increasing parochialism and decreasing tolerance, particularly when the status of one's group is threatened (e.g., Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-kaspa, 1998; Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004). Therefore, the negative association between social behavior and political tolerance (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009) as well as intolerance or otherwise antidemocratic political protest, can be accounted for by the motivation to socially enhance.

debate concerns conservative values or a change to the status quo; the motivation to seek the sacred, which encourages withdrawal from the political domain; and the motivation to search for purpose, which may either increase, decrease, or not affect interest, contingent on the perceived importance of political engagement in an individual's system of meaning. Religious private behavior is likely to yield a negative or null effect on interest in politics, holding all else constant, due to the underlying motivation to seek the sacred which facilitates indifference towards, or a tendency to withdraw from, the political domain. However, the motivation to search for purpose, when expressed by private behavior, can either increase, decrease, or be unrelated to political interest, depending on what one finds meaningful. Finally, religious social behavior is generally expected to increase interest due to the underlying motivations to affiliate with others and to socially enhance. Indeed, as indicated in Table 1, religious attendance shows the most consistent effect, typically increasing interest in politics. Nevertheless, an opposite effect may emerge if one's religious network views withdrawal from the public debate as a means of searching for purpose—that is, religious belonging can moderate the effect of social behavior.

Proposition 4: Sensitivity to context. The salience of different religious motivations, and therefore their influence on democratic norms, varies by religious, sociopolitical, and physical contexts.

The central feature of the REME model is the association between motivations for being religious and the expression of religion. The model captures interindividual differences in religious motivations and expressions. Different individuals will have different motivations for being religious, and these different motivations will have consequences for how each individual expresses his or her religion. To the extent that an individual's reasons for being religious are considerably stable over time, and to the extent that the manner in which a religious individual expresses his or her religion is relatively consistent over time, the REME model may appear to present associations with little intraindividual variability. However, this is not necessarily so. One of the features of goal constructs is their dynamism. Contextual cues may prime goals, goals may prime means, and means may prime goals (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah, 2003; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). Similarly, the salience of the different motivations and expressions of religion may vary by context. If a particular motivation is threatened, then the religious expression that is instrumental to attaining that motivation may be prioritized relative to alternative religious expressions. For instance, when a sense of meaning is threatened after one's mortality becomes salient, the motivation to find purpose and meaning may be activated. As a result, the religious expression that is instrumental to establishing meaning, such as religious belief, is strengthened (Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006; Vail, Arndt, & Abdollahi, 2012). Thus, the REME model is capable of capturing fluctuations in religious expressions by identifying changes in the salience of different religious motivations in different contexts. In the context of religion and democratic commitment, this dynamism means that it is necessary to understand which religious motivations are more salient and relevant for democratic commitment at a certain time and place. In Kurt Lewin's field-theory terminology (Lewin, 1936), determining which of the motives is relevant to a specific democratic norm requires examining the informational environment for cues that are salient at the time of the appraisal and reckoning whether, and which, religious goals are salient and take precedence over others (cf. Norenzayan, 2013).

A key contextual factor is the informational and normative environment due to religious denomination or congregation. For instance, the strength of the religiosity-tradition association was found to be contingent on religious belonging (stronger in the Jewish and Muslim samples than the Catholic samples; Saroglou et al., 2004). Accordingly, the overall negative effect of belief on democratic norms due to the motivation to maintain tradition can systematically vary by religious tradition.

Other contextual factors may be social or political.⁸ For instance, the existence of a salient intergroup conflict is a potent contextual factor. Whether made salient by religious elites or politicians, by information channeled through fellow congregants, or by a burning social issue easily lending itself to a clear-cut religious interpretation such as sexual morality, a salient intergroup conflict summons social religious goals and expressions pertaining to societal hierarchy. These, in turn, may shape endorsement of democratic norms, such as by increasing intolerance and discriminatory practices (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2016). However, depending on which group the religiously devout belongs to, the motivation for social enhancement may have positive effects on democratic commitment. Evidence shows that minority religious groups are more likely to express intrinsic support for democracy than the majority group members in settings where minority discrimination is high (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, in press). In this context, stronger motivation to affiliate with religious ingroup members and a stronger motivation to socially enhance relative to religious majority may be driving religious minorities to have higher levels of political consciousness and stronger support for democracy. Future research can further identify how restrictive or discriminatory religious contexts affect the way religious motivations and expressions are connected and how these differences may be reflected in the democratic orientations of different religious groups.

Another noteworthy contextual factor is the presence of religious symbols in peoples' physical environment. This has been exemplified by some contextual religious priming studies. For instance, in Jerusalem, participants near a religious location reported higher levels of religious ingroup favoritism compared to participants near a nonreligious location (Ben-Nun Bloom, Vishkin, Ben-Nun, Korenman, & Tamir, 2019). Thus, the informational environment should be considered when accounting for the potential effect of a certain religious motivation and expression.

Recommendations for Assessing the REME Model

The REME model adds clarity to the conceptualization of religiosity by specifying a fuller range of underlying factors governing its manifestation in political behavior. By doing so, it has the potential to inform guide research. Here, we would like to guide future empirical investigations with some recommendations.

Measurement

Measures for assessing religiosity abound (Hill & Edwards, 2013; Hill & Hood, 1999), which seems to at least partially explain some of the inconsistent findings regarding the effect of religiosity on democratic commitment in the literature. Offering a review of existing measures or recommending a set of consistent measures to avoid further confusions or complications is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we discuss points to consider when assessing motivations in religion and expressions of religion and for selecting appropriate samples to most rigorously test the REME model.

Assessing motivations Self-reporting motivations for why one is religious can be intellectually demanding because people might not frequently consider why they are religious. A similar problem was encountered in the assessment of personal values (Schwartz et al., 2001). To cope with this problem, personal values are assessed by providing short statements describing other people and asking participants how similar or different they are to that person. We advocate using a similar

⁸As far as the studies included in our review are concerned, most theoretical and empirical focus has been on religious traditions in the United States and to some extent Western European countries. More recently, Muslims in both Muslim-majority countries and in the West have also been investigated. Future studies can focus on understudied regions, and particularly Asia, Africa (except for North Africa), and Latin America.

method to assess motivations for being religious. Such a method has been implemented successfully to motivations for being religious in previous work (Cohen & Hill, 2007, Study 3).

Assessing expressions Numerous measures assess religious expressions. These can be appropriately modified to measure belief, social behavior, and private behavior. Religious belief may best be captured by measuring the strength of belief in particular religious tenets (e.g., De Jong, Faulkner, & Warland, 1976). Such a measure will most likely need to be modified to fit the idiosyncratic belief systems of a given participant pool. For example, assessing belief about the divinity of Jesus would be more relevant for a Christian sample than for a Jewish or Hindu sample. Religious social behavior may best be captured by measuring the frequency of participating in communal religious events and the religiosity of the members of one's social network, as in Ben-Nun Bloom et al. (2015). Religious private behavior may best be captured by measuring the frequency of engaging in private prayer, meditating, and learning religious texts (Stark & Glock, 1968).

Sample Selection

Level of religiosity The different motivations in the model are likely to be highly correlated with each other by virtue of being more common among individuals high in religiosity than among individuals low in religiosity. Such high intercorrelations may blur the distinctions in the model. The distinct associations between specific motivations and expressions of religion are likely to be more pronounced as the respondent, or the sample as a whole, is higher in religiosity.

Religious belonging In addition to selecting samples that are highly religious, the idiosyncratic assessment of religious beliefs requires accounting for religious belonging. Although it is worthwhile to examine the motivations when holding constant religious affiliation, assessment of the generalizability of the model would benefit from selecting samples from diverse religious affiliations, as some associations may be religion specific. For instance, as previously discussed, the association between the motivation to maintain tradition and the religious expression of beliefs might reflect a more Christian commitment to orthodoxy. In contrast, among adherents to more orthopraxic faiths such as Judaism, maintaining tradition may be associated more strongly with public and private behaviors than with belief. Such nuance can best be captured by recruiting samples whose religious affiliations are distinct.

Beyond Democratic Commitment

The general framework is readily applicable to sociopolitical and psychological constructs other than elements of democratic commitment, such as well-being, helping behavior, and economic attitudes. It can also enrich the study of outcomes typically analyzed within the 3B framework, such as candidate choice, attitudes on social issues, and partisanship. Still, we stress the importance of structural factors in potentially altering the meaning of the various components. For instance, when assessing the effect of religiosity on voting behavior in multiparty systems, it is important to consider the various venues for social affiliation (e.g., religious parties vs. conservative or patriotic parties). In certain cases, it may be worth noting that secular goals are not necessarily defined by the absence of religious goals. Generally, future investigations are warranted to test the model's viability in formulating propositions outside of the domain of democratic commitment. We believe that the key formation of the model in offering a theoretical synthesis of the literature in the political psychology of religion can tolerate some modifications, additional subconcepts, or key moderators that future empirical applications may identify.

Conclusions

Researchers have long recognized that religion is not a monolithic phenomenon which translates to a specific worldview. Religious experience consists of various expressions that lead to different and often conflicting attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Accordingly, a full account of how religion shapes endorsement of democratic norms must take into consideration the full array of these expressions. Still, as our review has pointed out, even taking into account the differential effects of these expressions leaves a number of gaps in our understanding of whether religiosity threatens or promotes democratic commitment. As a solution, we proposed the REME model, which presents an integration of religious motivations and expressions and offers a potential solution to the puzzling findings remaining in the literature.

The REME model is unique in that it integrates several existing bodies of literature in psychology. The psychology of religion literature has been preoccupied with the questions of *why* people are religious and *how* people are religious, but the two research programs spawned by these questions have never been integrated. Building on theories of goal constructs, the REME model proposes that the expressions of religion (the *how* question) can facilitate the attainment of motivations for being religious (the *why* question). The application of theories of goal constructs is also unique to the psychology of religion. While there are several accounts of goal striving in religion (Emmons, 1986, 2005; Schnitker & Emmons, 2013), they have been developed independently of research on goal constructs (Emmons, 1986, 2005; Schnitker & Emmons, 2013). We apply this model to the question of democratic commitment and suggest that the application of the model to the study of democratic commitment can reconcile the existing inconsistencies in the burgeoning literature on individual religiosity and democratic commitment. We believe that accounting for the relations between motivations for being religious and expressions of religion will advance the study of religion and democratic commitment not only by explaining the inconsistent findings but also by pointing to novel avenues for research. Here, we highlight several novel questions that arise from this model.

First, are some associations between motivations and expressions stronger than others? Seeking the sacred has been identified as a fundamental religious motivation (Pargament & Park, 1995), whereas social enhancement has not been discussed as an important motivation in most reviews of religious motivations. The relative weight of different associations is critical to understanding how much each motivation “loads” on each religious expression. Moreover, when mapping associations between religious motivations and expressions and democratic norms, such loadings will be critical in informing which motivations are most influential for each expression. For instance, according to the REME model, both seeking the sacred and maintaining tradition underly religious belief. The observation that they exert opposite effects on religious belief with regards to tolerance is insightful, but if seeking the sacred loads more strongly on religious belief than maintaining tradition, then across contexts religious belief will show a net positive effect on this democratic norm.

Second, do the associations between motivations for being religious and expressions of religion vary by religious affiliation? As we state above with regard to Christians and Jews, adherents of distinct religions may exhibit differences in focusing on belief or behavior (Cohen, 2003; Cohen & Rozin, 2001), and such differences may affect those associations. Thus, among Christians, the motivation to maintain tradition may be related more strongly to belief than behavior, whereas among Jews, the motivation to maintain tradition may be related more strongly to behavior than belief.

Third, and relatedly, do the associations between motivations for being religious and expressions of religion vary by culture or context? The same religion may be expressed differently in different settings (e.g., Sasaki & Kim, 2011). In a collectivist context, which emphasizes harmonious social relations, or in times of a heated interfaith conflict, social motivations, such as affiliation and social enhancement, may be stronger predictors of social behavior than in an individualist or peaceful context, wherein nonsocial motivations, such as seeking the sacred and maintaining tradition, may better

predict their congruent religious expressions. Further, a protracted intergroup conflict may activate the social motivation of social enhancement, whereas a socially homogenous collectivist context may activate the social motivation to affiliate with fellow congregants.

The REME model adds much nuance to how we understand the relationship between religion and democratic commitment. It suggests that democratic commitment depends on the religious motivation and the type of religious expression involved, as well as the larger social and political context. Being contingent on the informational environment in activating specific motivations out of its rich set makes religion amenable to manipulation by religious leaders, resulting in potentially opposite political stances. For instance, the Second Vatican Council's assertion that "In the groanings of the hungry, it is God who is hungry and is calling" (World Hunger a Challenge for All, 1996, #60) galvanized the motivation to seek the sacred, relating it to religious belief and support for social change toward equality. This was a stark contrast to the common packaging of the issue of social justice as conflictual with the motivation to maintain tradition, which calls for a defense of the current social order and its inequalities. Looking at the debate on immigration rights, Catholic leaders in the United States appeal to the teachings of the Scriptures that stress the motivation to seek the Godly in accepting Catholic immigrants, whereas some religious groups in Europe facing an interfaith conflict with Muslim immigrants arouse motivations that foster anti-immigration sentiment. Such examples show that, rather than being chronically dogmatic and right-wing in nature, religious appeals can yield a full range of political outcomes.

So, is religion good or bad for democracy? The REME model suggests that religion is neither inherently pro- nor antidemocratic. There is a wide range of contrasting religious ideas and values, and different environmental cues can activate a wide range of motives, and in turn lead to different religious expressions and political behaviors. Still, in the spirit of Kurt Lewin's (1936) famous formula by which behavior is a function of personal inclinations and environment, the total effect of religiosity on a particular political outcome can be estimated by summing the relative intensity of the various motivations activated in a particular context.

The proposed model has the potential to settle key controversies and inconsistencies in the literature about the relationship between religiosity and democracy, explaining how Alexis de Tocqueville regarded religion as vital for constituting the foundations necessary to counterweight the moral threats facing democracy, whereas Theodor Adorno and his colleagues thought it to be compatible with fascism. Our model suggests that religion has, at the same time, a strong motivational basis, answering to fundamental existential, epistemic and social needs, and an interpretive malleability and dependence on context. In contrast to the prediction of theories of modernization, this combination predicts that religion is a vital mobilizing force in democracies that will keep fueling political debates in rich and intriguing manners for years to come.

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